The Chinese military has just demonstrated its capability in the South China Sea triggering military
exercises in Taiwan and creased
foreheads in other countries daring to dispute China’s claims in these waters. Luckily for these countries, the US President finally seems to have woken
up to the diplomatic realities around the world and has hopefully understood
that narrow economic considerations alone cannot drive the world’s agenda.
In the backdrop of the air strike on Syria’s chemical weapons’ facilities and mutual muscle-flexing in
the South China Sea by US & Chinese ships comes news of the Indian
Air Force’s (IAF) GaganShakti 2018 exercise. A key part of the exercise, at
least as far as the IAF has let on,
has been demonstration of the capability of Su
30 MKI fighter aircraft to strike afar over the western seaboard with the help of its air-to-air refuelling assets. The IAF chief has apparently described this as reaffirmation of the force’s
ability to fight a war on two fronts. But, I think the IAF was actually exercising its ability to fight simultaneous wars on multiple fronts. Let me try to explain…
Historically, the Chinese have not been expansionist in
their outlook. Their emperors in fact built a ‘great wall’ to keep invaders out. For most of their first 50 years since the civil war and
proclamation of the People’s Republic in
1949, they have been insular. But
with an ever-growing population, which now stands at 1.4 billion, the need for resources is huge. This growing need for
resources has led to China expanding
its economic footprint in the resource-rich but vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia and Africa.
China has
always had a huge army, but the sudden thrust to expand the PLA-Navy has come about fairly recently.
This expansion has probably been prompted by the perceived need to protect its
growing economic interests in the afore-mentioned regions of the world. It was
also probably accelerated by the realisation that, in a unipolar world, its interests might come into direct conflict with
those of the US. The growing
modernisation and expansion of the Indian
Navy as a true blue water force
as well as India’s insistence on not
toeing the Chinese line with respect
to Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh has only added to their anxiety.
So, what exactly are
we talking about here?
Contrary to their protests regarding suspicion about
increasing Chinese military presence
in the Arabian Sea- Indian Ocean- Bay of
Bengal- Andaman Sea region, China has
established a military base in Djibouti in
the horn of Africa, at the very junction of the Gulf of Aden & the Red
Sea, one of the busiest sea lanes in the world. To the north of the Arabian Sea, the Pakistani port of Gwadar is
being developed as part of the Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the south, the government of Maldives is being assiduously wooed to
cater to Chinese and Pakistani maritime interests. Around
eight years ago, the southern port of Hambantota
was developed in Sri Lanka with Chinese help. In fact, to service the
debt burden for building the port it has been given to the Chinese on a 99 year lease!
Reports indicate that the port hardly gets any commercial traffic.
Barely 150 kms to
the north of the Andaman & Nicobar
Islands (India), lies Great Coco
Island (Myanmar). This island has a 6000
ft runway and is apparently being maintained by or for the Chinese military. These five places,
taken together, form a neat maritime ring around the Indian subcontinent unless of course, it’s probably my imagination
working overtime.
Let us see the approximate distances involved (calculated
in kms for ease of understanding) between these places and major IAF or, IN air bases…
Gwadar
(Balochistan, Pakistan) to Pune (India) is 1400 kms
Djibouti
(at the junction of the Gulf of Aden & the Red Sea, Africa) to Goa (India) is 3400 kms
Maldives (Indian Ocean) to Thiruvananthapuram
(Kerala, India) is 1200 kms
Hambantota (Sri Lanka) to Thiruvananthapuram
(Kerala, India) is 650 kms
Great Coco Island (Myanmar) to Car
Nicobar (A & N Is., India) is 575 kms
Great
Coco Island (Myanmar) to Visakhapatnam (India) is 1300 kms
IAF’s
GaganShakti 2018 exercise has apparently worked on the concept
of placing all the five places under range of its fighter aircraft operating
from the mainland. This theory has probably been experimented with because IN’s lone aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya along with its onboard
air assets of fighter aircraft & surveillance choppers is likely to be
bottled up or neutralised in case of any future conflict. In fact, for the carrier to be an effective threat, it
will probably have to operate in the southern Indian Ocean outside the threatening ring of five ports operating Chinese or Pakistani military assets. Bear in mind that Indian attempts to partner the government of Seychelles for protection of common maritime interests in the
region have run into rough weather thanks to a campaign launched by the
opposition parties in that country.
Chinese
merchant and military vessels access the
Arabian Sea- Indian Ocean- Bay of Bengal- Andaman Sea region as well as the
countries on the African continent
through the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait,
Lombuk Strait or Ombai Wetar Strait. These straits are roughly at distances
of 1200, 2700, 4200 and 5100 kms
respectively from Car Nicobar (A & N
Islands, India). With a capable air
force stationed at A & N Islands,
easy access of Chinese warships
into the Arabian Sea- Indian Ocean- Bay
of Bengal- Andaman Sea region can be controlled to a large extent and hence
building of the 6000 ft runway on Great Coco Island as a counterweight by
the Chinese. In years to come, we might see a couple of Chinese squadrons comprising of fighter
and surveillance aircraft operating
from this island.
Countries involved in
trade around the world do not normally go about brandishing their maritime
military capabilities. The patrolling of sea lanes by naval warships, like in
the Gulf of Aden, are usually a
reaction to piracy on the high seas and not with the intention of creating any
maritime blockade by competing nations. Even the presence of US warships in
virtually every corner of the globe has less to do with trade wars than as a
guarantor of peace and stability in those regions, punctuated by punitive
strikes against perceived offenders of international norms of conduct….but
that’s another story.
So, why is China suddenly
keen on developing the ability to project power well beyond the waters off its
coast? One reason could be that the country is in expansion mode armed with
coercive economic policies which might need to be buttressed with a bit of
armed diplomacy from time to time to help some recalcitrant nations fall in
line. This in turn might bring it into conflict with others keen to challenge
the Chinese and hence the heavy
armour. The other reason could be much more sinister in design as far as we are
concerned.
China has
effectively gained access to the Arabian
Sea over land through the Pakistani port
of Gwadar under its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) scheme.
It has sought direct access to this sea to cut trans-shipment cost of goods
which otherwise have to travel the long route through the Malacca Strait and around the countries of South Asia to reach mainland China.
However, the port of Gwadar lies
in the state of Balochistan which has
been fighting for autonomy/ independence from Pakistan for decades. The port is also roughly 2500 kms from the Karakoram
Pass in the Himalayan mountain
range which the goods carriers have to cross
to reach China. The terrain, the
weather and the possible threat from Baloch
fighters do not make this route a
particularly attractive prospect.
On the other hand, China
disputes Indian ownership of the
state of Arunachal Pradesh and has
already fought a war over it in 1962. The
Chinese would probably be willing to
punch through once again, this time with the intention of gaining access to the
waters of the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh. The 2017 stand-off with Chinese forces
at Doklam have again brought to fore Indian sensitivities regarding the 24 kms wide “chicken’s neck” (the narrow land corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh in India’s state
of West Bengal which connects the north-eastern states with the rest of India). Wringing this neck while attacking through Arunachal Pradesh and stoking ongoing
insurgencies in the other north-eastern states could be a strategy which the Indian government is very much alive to
and hence the scramble to develop road infrastructure and beef up military
assets in the region.
Any future attack by the Chinese would be coordinated with their “all weather” allies in the west who would only be too willing to
assist in any dismemberment plan, eager to return the favour of 1971. Chinese air and maritime assets
basing from the five ports ringing the subcontinent would most likely be used
to harass merchant shipping and engage Indian
air and maritime assets particularly those employed in the defence of A & N Islands. With the shortfall of
around 10 fighter squadrons (25 % less than the ideal strength of 42), the IAF would be hard-pressed to effectively counter threats from three directions as well as support the Indian
Navy to the south.
The country has to be prepared to handle sustained
pressure along our northern & western borders. Road and rail infrastructure
have to be developed in the north-eastern states on a war footing. We also need
to work up some pace in addressing major issues with respect to defence system
procurements and indigenous manufacturing. In this respect, the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ with industry is
probably the way ahead for us and has to be implemented swiftly cutting through
the bureaucratic bottlenecks. Let us be clear about one thing, the clock is
ticking and we have a great deal of catching up to do.
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