Personnel policies…Indian Navy’s ACR system

            An ancient Arabian proverb goes something like this…."An army of sheep led by a lion would defeat an army of lions led by a sheep". That leadership is key to the outcome of a battle has been a recognised fact probably since the time the first argument broke out between bands of men. One of the key functions of the Indian Navy too is to identify and groom leaders among men. In the Navy this job is “managed” by the Personnel branch or the HR department as it has started to call itself over the last few decades, to give it a more “corporate” and contemporaneous look & feel.

            The HR functions devolve from the central control of Naval Headquarters (NHQ) at Delhi through the different administrative command headquarters to the units at sea level. A record of the activities each officer has indulged in every year is prepared confidentially at unit level and forwarded through the chain of command to Delhi where it is presumably sifted through and analysed by a team of carefully selected officers assisted possibly by patented software and number-crunching digital hardware to spew forth the names of the select few for various leadership roles, diplomatic assignments, promotions, higher academic courses, etc.

            All this appears very complicated and much of it certainly is. But, a large part of what HR does leaves many disappointed and frustrated. That this dissatisfaction hasn’t yet assumed threatening proportions is probably more due to our faith in karma which comes to our rescue to assuage and console than due to any coherent and believable feedback from the organisation itself. This article focuses on the annual assessment that each officer faces, its implications and possible ways to improve the system.

            “Annual confidential reports” (ACR) are raised by each “initiating officer” (IO) on the officers reporting to him. As far as I am aware, almost every officer being assessed is verbally lauded by his IO for his performance in the past year in that unit. Since the report is “confidential”, the officer however never comes to know the contents actually penned by the IO. Each IO marks according to his subjective assessment of the officer. Also every IO marks differently. So, a bunch of officers of the same seniority being assessed by different IOs would be marked differently even if their performance has more or less been the same in the period under review. Also the IOs, separated as they are by seniority & geography, do not in any case know the assessments made by each other & yet blithely go about assuring the officer being reported upon that he is one of the best walking around!

            The question then arises, maybe the IOs are hand-picked individuals trained in the art of assessing others? Unfortunately, this is not the case. The Navy tries to solve this problem by having a “reviewing officer” (RO) and a “senior reviewing officer” (SRO) who ostensibly check and review the IO’s report. A multitude of officers being reported upon presumably also leads to formulation of general guidelines by the RO/ SRO for IOs to follow.

            Can this system really work Navy-wide without large scale dissatisfaction? The Navy thinks that it has solved the problem by keeping everything confidential and informing/ reassuring the officer that his report has been seen by the RO as well as the SRO thereby in a way certifying the assessment made by the IO. At this stage, belief in karma and the next immediate crisis kicks in to distract the officer from any further contemplation of the last ACR rendered……

            Every officer usually serves anything between 1 to 5 years with an IO before both or either of them move on. The ACR season rolls around every year and reports are rendered with the officer at no time being aware of his actual overall performance vis-à-vis his coursemates as per the records being maintained centrally at NHQ, Delhi. Some “smart” officers develop an understanding of the inner workings of this system early in life and try to utilise their “connections” in high places to get a sense of where they are placed within the course. Some of them then even end up trying to manipulate it through their “godfathers” within the system.

            The recent adverse judgement in a case of nepotism against a three-star Admiral is indicative of a system in urgent need of overhaul. The faith in being judged fairly by the system has eroded to such an extent that the officer concerned preferred to leave the Navy first before seeking vindication through the judicial system. While some officers do try to take on the system from within and seek redress, most others choose to swallow the bitter pill and move on.

            In all this, the Directorate of Personnel (DoP) which actually receives & processes the ACRs to decide the future for each officer & indeed the Navy by implication, maintains a deafening silence. Since DoP has the overall picture, they should be responsible for periodic counselling of each officer on his career graph. However this does not happen and it is left to the individual IOs, who simply don’t have this information, to “manage” the officer!  

            An officer is in the late thirties/ early forties by the time he/ she completes 18 years of service. He is thus at the prime of his professional life at this time. Under the present system, almost every officer who is overlooked for promotion to the rank of Captain after around 18 years of being told by almost every IO that he is the best, receives a severe blow to his morale and sense of worth and ends up with a feeling of betrayal. Before Nov 2015, some at this stage used to opt for the honourable option of voluntary retirement. However, even this has been made a difficult choice for them by the government’s decision to deny the benefits of ‘one rank one pension’ (OROP) to those who seek voluntary retirement.  

            An officer cannot be expected to always be looking over his shoulder to see whether the Navy is doing right by him. It is a matter of trust & faith in the organisation which affords him the freedom to move ahead with confidence in the discharge of his duties. It is this betrayal of trust which hits hardest without warning when he suddenly finds that he has been overlooked for promotion, because all along the long 18 years he had been told by his IOs that he was doing an excellent job.

            Sometimes an IO does point out areas needing improvement in the officer’s deportment. But, probably since he too would not like to have a disillusioned individual serving with him, the IO hastens to give the impression that the shortcomings are par for the course for an officer of comparable seniority. The poor IO has no choice! With no inputs from DoP, how does the IO advise the officer regarding his future career prospects? The system thus fails not just the officer being reported upon but also the officer rendering the annual confidential report.   

            In my opinion, much of the unnecessary mess caused by this shroud of secrecy around ACRs can and must be resolved. One way could be the annual publication of the relative merit position, something like a “cumulative grade point average” (CGPA), of each officer vis-à-vis his coursemates by the Directorate of Personnel. While the records are maintained right from the beginning at DoP, the publication of this list could start from say the third year of service giving each officer more than 10 years to judge his relative overall performance against others before the first “select list” promotion to the rank of Captain rolls around. This would in no way detract from confidentiality of the annual reporting system. In fact, publication of such a list would help individual officers understand the logic behind selection for different courses, ship/ squadron appointments, etc. as well as the reasons for non-promotion, if it came to that.

            Along with this shift in the way we deal with HR issues, DoP should prepare and publish the list of broad criteria specific to such selections instead of leaving it shrouded by secrecy and hence open to suspicions of manipulation. Most importantly, while on the one hand the annual publication of such a merit list would help those officers who are clearly beyond the possibility of promotion vis-à-vis their coursemates after 18 years of service to come to terms with reality and prepare for the next phase of their personal and professional lives, it would also give each IO something to work with while counselling or rendering career advice to the officer. This can only be good for the system wherein each officer is encouraged and guided by the organisation towards optimum performance and is thus indicative of a system which chooses to take care of its own.          

            Naysayers would say that to put in place such a system would encourage unhealthy competition between officers. On the contrary….I would wager that opening up the system of assessments for scrutiny would help in tempering unbridled and at times unhealthy ambition. In fact, it would engender a realistic and timely assessment of one’s worth in the organisation and provide the opportunity for adoption of necessary corrective measures by everyone. Such an outcome can only be for the betterment of the Navy.

                                               

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