Military aviation has come a
long way over the last hundred years. The real push however, came during the Second World War when the scientific and
industrial capabilities of countries were pitted against each other. During the
war years, military aviation went from the British
propeller-driven Supermarine Spitfire
at the beginning to the German
turbojet Messerschmitt Me 262 towards
the end. It hasn’t looked back ever
since and has in many cases been at the forefront of technological
advancements.
Within ten years after the end of the Second World War, the Avro Arrow (CF-105), a Canadian delta-winged supersonic twin-engined
interceptor aircraft was on the drawing boards. In the supercharged atmosphere
of the cold war era, it took less than a decade for A. V. Roe Canada Ltd (a subsidiary of the Hawker Siddeley Group) to progress from design and development of
the Avro Arrow to the flight testing
stage on 25 Mar 1958, a little over 60 years ago.
One of the challenges of the era with respect to high speed flight was the onset of wave drag at supersonic speeds. The effects of wave drag are so strong that engines of the era could not provide
enough power to overcome the sound
barrier. To reduce the effects of wave
drag, the concept of swept wings
and delta wings took root. According
to James C Floyd, the chief design
engineer at Avro Aircraft Ltd, the
choice of a tailless delta
configuration for the Avro Arrow was
apparently based mainly on the compromise of attempting to achieve structural
and aero elastic efficiency with a very thin wing while at the same time
achieving a large internal fuel capacity for the specified range. A concept
which was subsequently adopted successfully for other delta-winged aircraft.
The Avro Arrow,
CF-105 was designed to meet specifications which, among other things,
required 05 minutes from starting the
engines of the aircraft to reaching an altitude of 50,000 feet & Mach 1.5 and to have a turn-around time on the ground of less than 10 minutes.
To the credit of the design team of engineers, the
aircraft went supersonic on its third flight and on the seventh went past 1600 km/h at 50,000 feet (or,
Mach 1.5) while climbing, finally
achieving Mach 1.9 in steady level flight. This is nothing
short of an incredible feat of engineering considering the fact that the first manned supersonic flight in the world had
taken place just about a decade before on 14
Oct 1947 by an experimental aircraft ‘drop
launched’ from the bomb bay of an American
B-29 aircraft.
Among other bold engineering concepts, the Avro Arrow was the first in aviation to
use a 4000 psi hydraulic system, a
rudimentary fly-by-wire system to
move the various flight controls as well as the consequent incorporation of an “artificial feel” system to literally
provide the pilot with a better “feel” of the controls. Titanium alloys were used for parts of the airframe, a metal whose
virtues were known but was difficult to work with and hence not much used
outside the Soviet Union and
particularly not in aviation.
With the aircraft having completed majority of its test
programme within the short period of one
year since first flight and approaching the acceptance phase by the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the project was abruptly cancelled on 20 Feb 1959 apparently due to a
re-evaluation of threats, the consequent defensive measures and the cost of
those defensive systems. Two months later, the paranoia of the cold war era,
specifically fears of a Soviet mole in Avro,
apparently led to the assembly line, tooling, plans and existing airframes as
well as its Iroquois engines being
ordered destroyed. 20 Feb 1959 thus
became known as “Black Friday” in the
Canadian aviation industry dealing it a massive body blow.
The Avro Arrow programme
apparently received its initial impetus due to the perceived threat from Soviet long-range bomber jets like the Myasishchev M-4 Bison. However, during
the Arrow’s short development phase,
the move from long-range bombers to ICBMs
by the Soviets and the consequent
need to finance the defensive measures (NORAD’s
SAGE system) to counter this new threat proved too much for the Canadian government leading to
cancellation of the Avro Arrow programme.
On closer examination, a few other interesting details
emerge…the American SAGE system
primarily depended on Boeing’s nuclear-tipped Bomarc long range surface-to-air missile. The scrapping of the Arrow programme also wouldn’t have hurt the prospects of the US aircraft manufacturing industry. In
fact, it is rumoured that within months of this decision of the Canadian government, the CIA approached Lockheed Martin for development of a surveillance aircraft which
could fly faster and higher than the U-2 which
ultimately resulted in the Mach 3+ SR-71
Blackbird!
Apart from the huge political controversy at the time
over the decision to scrap the programme, it is estimated that the immediate
aftermath put almost 30,000 employees
of Avro and other support ancillaries
out of work. It also reportedly led to a sort of ‘brain drain’ of top scientists, engineers and technicians from Avro, Canada to NASA’s Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programmes. Significantly, the Canadian aviation industry has not
developed a home-grown supersonic fighter
aircraft for the RCAF ever since.
Quite ironically though, the Avro Arrow was an aircraft any country could justifiably be proud
of. Rumours abound about it also being the impetus for studies which were in
progress at the time for a Mach 3 version
similar to the MiG-25, along with
plans for the development of more powerful engines to power it beyond 70,000 feet in altitude. It is said that
as recently as 2010 or so, those aware of the Avro Arrow aircraft’s design and capabilities were in favour of
resurrecting it from the ashes, as it were, to develop it further as an
alternative to the Lockheed Martin F-35!
Compared
to our Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas),
the Avro Arrow (CF-105) was a beast
of an aircraft. Just to illustrate, the wing
area and empty weight were around 3 times that of the LCA! Though the LCA is being built by a PSU
while the Arrow was the product of
private enterprise, military weapons and weapon systems programmes need the
support of the government-of-the-day
to survive and thrive. They have long gestation periods, are driven by future
threat perceptions moderated by economic considerations and are, unfortunately
for the purists, prone to political compulsions.
The close military embrace with Canada provides the US
with strategic depth while at the same time subsuming its northern neighbour’s
threat perceptions within the ambit of its own defensive umbrella for its
mainland. We do not have that luxury and thus whatever the nature of any
intergovernmental agreement with friendly countries, the indigenous ability to
counter threats from space, air, land and sea has to be developed, maintained
and nurtured.
In the field of aviation, the research and development
effort in India for an indigenous
fighter aircraft after the HF-24 (Marut)
was likely paused due to the availability of the MiG series of aircraft from the Soviet
Union. ‘Made in India’ gave way
to ‘assembled in India’ and it was
therefore a herculean task for our aeronautical establishment subsequently to
conceptualise and build a fighter aircraft for the future, literally from
scratch, which when delivered to the IAF could
prove to be an equal match for other aircraft of its generation.
The LCA
programme, which started in the pre-liberalised era of the early 80s, has weathered many storms including those imposed due to
our nuclear test in 1998. It is a
credit to those associated with the programme that it has advanced thus far
where we now have an IAF squadron
equipped with it.
These are early days for the LCA in an operational environment and there will be the inevitable
teething problems and issues with respect to maintenance and capability as it
is put through its paces during combat exercises and the daily grind of a
squadron routine. It is also probably the reason the aircraft has been based at
Sulur close to HAL’s hub at Bengaluru.
The learning curve would be steep and continuous development and support from HAL the key to success. For the IAF and the Indian Navy, as well as the country at large, it will be a time for
patience and continued faith in the capability of our aeronautical
establishment.
The Air Force
and Navy versions of the Tejas LCA as well as the Kaveri engine programme need to be
supported and taken forward, albeit with clear goals and timelines, even as we
shop around for the likes of Rafale, F-35, etc. to help shore up the ‘capability gaps’. It must be kept in
mind that the real loss from any attempt to sideline the Tejas LCA like its predecessor the HF-24 (Marut) would be the shying away from possibilities for the
future of not just our indigenous fighter aircraft programme but also the consequent
spin-offs in the form of the sharpening of our technological capabilities that
such an ongoing research and development programme can engender.
To walk away now, would be to reject our destiny for a
second time within fifty years.
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