A few years ago, a large
warship was commissioned by the Indian Navy. It seems a little ridiculous to
say that since the Navy has been commissioning large warships for some time
now. But the news which followed a few weeks later carried much greater
implication for planners and armchair analysts like me with nothing better to
do than split hairs over the details.
So, for the sake of this exercise let’s assume that it
was the guided missile destroyer INS
Kolkata, the lead ship of its class, which was commissioned in August 2014.
It had taken more than 10 years from the laying of the keel in September 2003
to the ship’s own tryst with destiny a full 67 years after the country’s
independence. Quite obviously, it would have spent much time on the drawing
boards and in the minds of planners and designers from well before 2003. The
government however accorded sanction for its manpower after the ship was commissioned in August 2014.
Now, it is safe to assume that a destroyer with an
approximate displacement of 7500 tons
and bristling with weapons, machinery, armaments and sensors would need a
sizeable crew to perform the critical functions required for it to float, move
& fight. This crew would presumably comprise of an officer of the rank of
Captain with more than 20 years of service and a number of officers of the rank
of Commander, Lieutenant Commander and Lieutenant of varying seniority across
different branches like Executive, Engineering, Electrical, Logistics, etc.
with different specialisations like Gunnery, Aviation, Navigation,
Communication, etc. as well as sailors from these same branches of different
ranks, seniority & specialisation.
Quite clearly, for the crew to gain proficiency in their
respective fields commensurate with their respective seniority and rank, before
being posted onboard INS Kolkata would
take a number of years…in fact, upward of 20 years for the Captain & a few
of the most senior sailors. This would not normally be a problem if INS Kolkata was replacing a ship of
similar type & class since theoretically, the crew from
the ship being decommissioned would simply move to the ship being commissioned.
But if that was the case, the government wouldn’t have needed to accord a
separate sanction for its manpower. INS
Kolkata was therefore an addition to the sanctioned strength of the Indian
Navy.
As per information available from the 4th report of the Standing Committee on Defence (2014-15),
the Indian Navy had a force level of 127 ships, 15 submarines and 236 aircraft
while in 2012, DAC had approved 198 ships and submarines for the Indian Navy. Leaving the numbers of
aircraft aside for the time being, the Navy is therefore projected to grow by a
total of 56 ships and submarines in
the foreseeable future after taking into account any ships or submarines which
would retire or be decommissioned during the same time period. For the sake of
argument, let us assume INS Kolkata
to be the first of the 56.
I am a novice in the world of finance and economics and
have to frequently take the assistance of an auditor to file my tax returns.
But if my understanding of budgetary calisthenics is correct, the acquisition
of these 56 ships & submarines would be accounted under Capital expenditure. The expenses to
maintain these ships, submarines and of course the personnel who would man them
would however be budgeted under Revenue
expenditure.
So while Capital expenses are considered to be “one-off” in nature & incurred to
acquire assets, Revenue expenses are
incurred to meet ongoing operational costs of that asset & are recurring in
nature. Notionally however, both kinds of expenses would have to be considered
while deciding to accord the government’s sanction for the addition of a new
ship to the existing “sanctioned”
strength of the Navy. In fact, what you are thinking is right, the Navy
prepares a comprehensive case which includes the material as well as manpower
assets whenever a case for fresh “government
sanction” is required to be taken up as must have been the case with INS Kolkata. Logically speaking, since the manpower to run the ship should
ideally be in place when the ship is commissioned into service, the government sanction for manpower should
be accorded along with that for the ship at the very least. This time lapse
between government sanction for the
ship and the government sanction for
its manpower would in part explain the perennial shortage of personnel that the
Indian Navy seems to be grappling
with.
According to an independent website, in 2016, the Indian Navy had a sanctioned strength of 11,384
officers & 67,639 enlisted personnel for a total of 79,023 personnel and there was a shortage of 1,518 officers and 9,640 enlisted personnel for a total shortage of 11,158 personnel. A news website quoting the Defence Minister also reported on 27 Dec 17 that the current manpower strength of the Indian Navy is 67,228 personnel & the number of “vacant positions” is 16,225.
The terms “shortage” or “vacant” seem to imply that the Navy for some strange reason is
unable to find enough suitable candidates in one of the most populous countries
in the world! This is nothing but a mis-representation of facts & the website
probably misunderstood the Defence
Minister thereby giving rise to “alternative
facts”, as popularised by one of Mr.
Trump’s advisers. Theoretically speaking, notwithstanding the
classification of this existing manpower
gap of 16,225 to close it would
necessitate the speed of capital asset inductions to be slowed while
decommissioning the older vessels at a faster rate. However, apart from this
solution being unpalatable, it would still not cater for the expansion in sanctioned strength…that figure of 56 ships & submarines which the DAC has approved as the growth
element.
Quite clearly then, the rate of addition of capital assets would also depend on the Navy’s ability to absorb the inductions
with the existing manpower. And that is where the term “Manning Plan” for a unit comes in. I would define it as the sharing of poverty. Basically, it is the
method by which the existing sanctioned
strength of manpower for the sanctioned
units is distributed between units whose manpower sanction hasn’t yet
materialised on the ground (think INS
Kolkata’s case) as well as “unsanctioned”
units. The latter are units which are required by the Navy to effectively do its job but have not yet been accorded government sanction.
So, what we have from the Defence Minister’s reported assertion regarding manpower shortages
is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. This iceberg will only grow in size
and not just because of new inductions but also due to the need to constantly
review and revise the manpower for already
sanctioned units which have been operating for years. I am referring to the
Naval bases and establishments here.
With the growth of the Navy over the past 70 years in
terms of capital inductions in the form of ships, submarines and aircraft the
task of the support units which supply and house them or train their manpower
or inspect their equipment or provide medical/ legal aid, etc. etc. has also
grown. While the government sanction
for new inductions do cater to a limited extent for this back-end support, it
is but a drop in the ocean. The support units themselves are fighting a
constant battle to upgrade infrastructure but, what about the addition of
manpower to handle the increase in infrastructure, the increase in the training
load, the requirement for support to more ships/ submarines/ aircraft?
From my experience, I have found that units generally
depend on the Manning Plan to bail
them out. In effect, depending on redistribution of existing manpower without
actually seeking a government sanction
for additional manpower to satisfactorily discharge their duties commensurate
with their enhanced role & scope of operations. To illustrate, in one of
the units served, the last government
sanction for additional manpower had been accorded in 1978! Almost four decades down the line and with a vastly enhanced
scope, not only did the unit not have adequate manpower, its borne strength of officers had never
reached the manpower sanctioned in 1978!
This gap of sanctioned strength and borne strength was taking place because
of the “sharing of poverty”, that is
to meet the requirements of other sanctioned
units whose manpower was yet to be recruited/ trained as well as those unsanctioned units which are yet to
receive the government’s sanction.
The magnitude of the adverse effect that this situation can have on our
training and battle preparedness can only be guessed at.
Is anyone doing something to address the situation? In
the field of training, at least one Vice
Admiral who retired recently did recognise the enormity of the problem.
Unfortunately, the game of musical chairs in Flag ranks at that point in time put paid to his vision. For the
manpower situation to be addressed on a war footing, we need every unit to
critically review its current manpower requirement and higher formations to
factor in the future requirements for
each unit based on growth projections for
that Area/ Command to meet the higher Naval directives for force build-up &
augmentation of infrastructure.
A Navy should
be involved in re-equipping in terms
of men & material as well as
constantly training in times of peace
to prepare for conflict. Manpower underpins all of this. We choose to ignore
the one for the other at our own peril.
Comments
Post a Comment